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I. Introduction
Sudan is a big country. It covers some 2.5-million square kilometers, or the size
of Ontario and Québec combined. It is ethnically rich but developmentally poor: in 2001
it stood 138th in the U.N. Development Program’s Human Development Index, a broad
measure of attainments in life expectancy, education and real income.
For all but 12 years since its independence in 1956 Sudan has been marked by a
low-intensity civil war between the largely Arab and Muslim northern half of the country
and the largely Black and Christian/animist south. The conflict involves an array of
ethnic groups and has roots going back several centuries.2 In recent times the conflict has
had devastating repercussions on the civilian population. The United Nations estimates
that two million people have died in the fighting since 1983 and at least four million more
are internally displaced.3 There have been reports of serious human rights violations by
all sides, including abduction, slavery, forced displacement, starvation and murder. In
1999 the U.N. Rapporteur on Human Rights in Sudan termed the plight of civilians
caught in the conflict “one of the most important human rights concerns facing the
international community.”4
The civil war entered a new, and particularly vicious, phase in the late 1990s with
the discovery of commercially viable quantities of oil in the south. The Sudanese
government granted concessions for exploitation of the fields to foreign oil companies
and sponsored the construction of a 1540-kilometre pipeline from southern oil fields to
Port Sudan, a site on the Red Sea, to get the oil to market. The Chinese-built pipeline was
one of the largest civil works projects in Sudanese history and represented a considerable
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achievement when oil began flowing in 1999. Sudan, which previously had to spend
foreign exchange on its oil import bill, suddenly attained a degree of energy selfsufficiency and started to make money from oil exports. In the period 1998-2000 inflows
of oil money went from being negligible to contributing 28.4% of government revenue.5
The money represented an opportunity to increase development spending, but at least
some of it has gone towards military purchases.6 This has given a new edge to
government forces. In January 2001 the U.N. Rapporteur indicated that “[o]il exploitation
has resulted in the exacerbation of the war.”7
The Khartoum government’s principal opponent in the war is the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA), which sees oil exploitation as enhancing the government’s
ability to fight.8 In 1994 the government and southern opposition groups concluded a
Declaration of Principles, the cornerstone of which was official recognition of the right
of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan. In 1995, however, the
government chose to pursue a strategy of “peace from within” and in April 1997 signed
the Khartoum Peace Agreement with six splinter rebel groups in which it emphasized that
the general principles of the Declaration would guide future talks. Nevertheless, the
SPLA refused to sign the Agreement because the government declared that it did not
consider the Declaration to be binding, but merely a basis for future discussions. As a
result hostilities continue.
Plans for an oil pipeline from the south were first made by Chevron, an American
oil company, which began exploration in 1975. In 1984 the company halted its Sudan
operation in response to the abduction and killing of three expatriate Chevron workers by
the SPLA. Chevron eventually pulled out of Sudan altogether and sold its Sudanese
assets to a small Canadian oil company which was acquired by Talisman Energy Inc. of
Calgary in October 1998. As part of the purchase Talisman took over a 49,200-sq. km.
concession 700 kilometres south of Khartoum. Talisman decided to operate the
concession with the help of Chinese, Malaysian and Sudanese partners through a
Mauritius-registered joint venture, Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
(GNPOC), in which it retains a 25 percent interest.9 In 2000 Talisman provided the
5
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government of Sudan with $306-million worth in royalties from its share in GNPOC and
reported a $126-million profit on Sudan operations.10
Fig. 1
GNPOC Concession and Route of Oil Pipeline in Sudan
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The GNPOC concession sits in the heart of disputed territory. Southern rebel
groups have threatened that those working with the consortium will be regarded as, in
effect, "northern" accomplices.11 Talisman therefore requested the Sudanese government
to ensure law and order in the concession.12 To meet this request the government has
Decisions made by committees within GNPOC require an affirmative vote of two members of the
board representing at least 60% interest.
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employed the military and government-armed militias. There is, however, considerable
evidence that the government has been using concession facilities to launch offensive
operations within the concession and further south.13
Talisman's investment in Sudan therefore raises profound concern about corporate
operations in countries where there are serious and frequent human rights violations. The
company's presence has been interpreted by many as providing essential support to a
repressive regime and as condoning the government's policies towards the south. This
leads to the question what, if any, are Talisman's obligations at this particular juncture,
one of fertile development in the field of international corporate social responsibility?
This comment examines this question in light of recent events.
II. Talisman Energy and the Harker Report
Talisman has been the subject of scrutiny and criticism from church groups and
other NGOs since the outset of its involvement in Sudan. These groups allege that
GNPOC operations are aiding and abetting aggression against the civilian population.
The principal criticisms made against Talisman can be grouped in three categories. The
first concerns discriminatory hiring and forcible displacement of population in the
concession area and along the pipeline route. The second involves the utilization of
GNPOC-built facilities by Sudanese government forces for offensive military purposes.
The third centers around the use of GNPOC-generated oil revenue by the Sudanese
government for prosecution of the war.
In October 1999 growing criticism led the Canadian government to announce that
it would send an envoy, former ILO representative John Harker, to Sudan to conduct an
assessment mission of Talisman's operations. The inquiry was premised on the idea that
there was a link between oil exploitation and human rights abuses, particularly slavery
and slave-like practices, and that Canada was, in some sense, internationally responsible
for the acts of its corporate "citizen", Talisman Energy. Harker's report concluded that
GNPOC installations had been used to commit human rights violations, “that Sudan is a
place of extraordinary suffering … and [that] the oil operations in which a Canadian
company is involved add more suffering.”14
The Canadian government did not respond in any legal way to Harker’s

In its Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000 Talisman notes that “Despite the
Company’s stated position regarding the use of the Heglig airstrip and advocacy efforts in this
regard, we believe that there were at least four instances of non-defensive usage of the Heglig
airstrip in 2000. On these occasions helicopters or planes landed on the airstrip for reasons that
we could not determine were related to oilfield security and their presence was considered nondefensive by Talisman.” (p. 16). See also J. Sallot, “Ottawa covering up for Talisman in Sudan,
MP says”, The Globe and Mail A5 (May 5, 2001).
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conclusions.15 Instead, it requested Talisman to abide by the International Code of Ethics
for Canadian Business, a voluntary code of corporate conduct designed to be monitored
by neutral third parties.16 The Canadian government also instituted a policy of
engagement with the Sudanese regime, opening a consular office in Khartoum and
holding talks with Sudanese officials on the human rights situation in the country.
Talisman adopted the Code in December 1999. Despite this action the company
continues to be dodged by criticism and threats of shareholder divestment. In February
2000 the United States announced sanctions against GNPOC and in May 2000 a group of
shareholders asked Talisman's Board of Directors to prepare an independently verified
report on the company's compliance with the Code within 180 days. Talisman
subsequently released its first Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Report under the
Code in April 2001.17
III. Corporate Social Responsibility in Domestic and International Law
A corporation is a legal entity distinct from its shareholders with separate liability
and the capacity of continuous succession.18 Although it is not unknown in international
law, the corporation is principally a creation of domestic law and generally organized
according to the laws of one jurisdiction.19 The typical corporation’s business and affairs
are managed by the board of directors who owe a duty to the corporation’s collective
ownership, the shareholders. Traditionally this duty was thought of as being to protect the
corporation’s capital and produce profits.
In the 20th century duties owed by directors in law began to expand to employees,
consumers and the general public. Recent literature on corporate governance refers to the
“stakeholder” concept of the corporation, or the idea that the conduct of the corporation’s
15
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business affects not only shareholders but other sectors of the public as well. There is the
increasingly current view that these other interests should be accounted in some way.
Apart from specific statutory obligations, however, courts in Canada and
elsewhere have in general been reluctant to accept the idea that corporate directors owe a
duty to the general public or to any particular sector thereof.20 Instead, changes taking
place in corporate governance are being self- or statutorily imposed. For instance, many
mutual funds already keep a close watch on how firms deal with a variety of
controversies. This growing interest is also reflected in amendments to legislation in
countries like Britain, where new rules require pension funds to disclose how they deal
with outside issues.21
International law does not yet have much to say formally about corporate social
responsibility. The language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights22, which
speaks of “every individual and every organ of society” as having a duty to strive for the
promotion of human rights, is sometimes referred to as evidence that corporations, as
legal persons, have such a duty. Certain instruments, such as the ILO Tripartite
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy23, the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises24 and the U.N. Draft International Code
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations25, could be considered a framework for
international corporate behavior, but none has been consistently endorsed in terms of
adherence or practice by a clear majority of the international community. There remains,
in addition, the question of how to regulate private entities in a system of public law.
Moreover most instruments have been drafted by existing states and, in deference to
sensitivities of sovereignty, focus more on individual human rights than on group rights
to self-determination now at the heart of the conflict in Sudan. For instance the Tripartite
Declaration provides that:
“The firmly established rule at common law was that directors owe a fiduciary obligation to the
corporation, but not to individual shareholders. The current view would appear to be that, while
special circumstances may give rise to a fiduciary relationship between a director and
shareholders, no general fiduciary obligation exists.” McCarthy Tétrault, Directors and Officers
Duties and Liabilities in Canada 42-43 (1997); see Bell v. Source Data Control Ltd., (1988) 66
O.R. (2d) 78 (C.A.); Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc. (1987), 60 O.R. (2d) 737 (H.C.),
aff’d (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.). In England see Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum,
[1974] A.C. 821 (P.C.); in the United States see Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
20
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All parties concerned by this Declaration should respect the sovereign rights of
States, obey the national laws and regulations, give due consideration to local
practices and respect relevant international standards. They should respect the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the corresponding International
Covenants adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations as well as the
Constitution of the International Labour Organisation and its principles …. They
should also honour commitments which they have freely entered into, in
conformity with the national law and accepted international obligations.26

These human rights are important, but they alone are not a useful measure of Talisman’s
activities in the current context. Some accounting of Talisman’s activities in relation to
group rights is necessary.
Recently, the position of international law regarding corporate social
responsibility has begun to change. This is happening for two reasons. First, there has
been tremendous development of soft law codes of conduct, a development prompted in
part by the lack of anything similar at an official level. Initiatives such as the Amnesty
International Guidelines for Companies27, Social Accountability 800028, the U.N. Global
Compact29, the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility Benchmarks for
Measuring Business Performance30 and the Global Sullivan Principles31 have
proliferated. These seem to appeal to the free-market tenor of the times in being nongovernmental and self-regulating.

26
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Second, the foregoing private initiatives, together with renewed concern about
international corporate power and business ethics, are promoting something of a
renaissance in multilateral efforts to define corporate social responsibility. Thus, new
voluntary instruments have either been adopted or are under consideration by the U.N.32,
OECD33 and EU34.
One multilateral initiative meriting particular attention is the United Nations Draft
Human Rights Guidelines for Companies35. The Draft Human Rights Guidelines were
begun in 1999 in response to concern about the unwieldly proliferation of soft law.
Simply put, the fear was that the multiplicity of mechanisms was allowing companies to
pick and choose or to claim that the range of choices inhibited them from acting. The
Guidelines thus seek to comprehensively interpret the Universal Declaration in a form
which can be implemented by private entities. The Guidelines are more precise and
nuanced than the Universal Declaration, and therefore better at covering the variety of
circumstances in which human rights need protection. For example Draft Art. 16 states
that:
Companies shall have the responsibility to ensure that their business operations
do not contribute directly or indirectly to human rights abuses and actively to
speak out or otherwise use their influence in order to help promote and ensure
respect for human rights.

The reference here regarding indirect corporate contribution to human rights abuses is
particularly noteworthy. Likewise, Draft Art. 18 states that:
Companies shall respect the rights of indigenous communities and minorities to
own, develop, control, protect, and use their lands and cultural and intellectual
property; indigenous communities and minorities may not be deprived of their
own means of subsistence.

This last provision presents something of an advance over the statist position of previous
documents. Properly implemented, it could sanction the kind of activity Talisman now
finds itself undertaking in southern Sudan. However the Draft Guidelines remain both a

32

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights is currently working on a set of Draft Universal Human Rights Guidelines for
Companies. See E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/WG.2/WP.1/Add.1 (2001).
33
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35
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“draft” and “guidelines”, with all the limited normative significance that those terms
entail. The long-term hope is that they will one day become a binding framework for
companies, but at present they are not.
In the meantime it is possible to conclude that Talisman, in continuing to operate
in Sudan with clear evidence that oil revenues are financing the civil war, is indirectly
contributing to serious human rights abuses. In this respect it is in breach of the Draft
Guidelines and, by extension, the Universal Declaration. A second conclusion is that
Talisman is operating in the south with permission of the government. Given the state of
civil war in the country, however, that permission cannot be said to reflect the will of
southerners. As a minority they are entitled to a degree of control over resources
emanating from their lands. This is confirmed by a number of new instruments.36 It is
also rapidly becoming a norm of state practice. Talisman is therefore in breach of the
Draft Guidelines and of an emerging norm of international law in appropriating resources
without consent.
IV. The International Code of Ethics for Canadian Business
A Canadian attempt to deal with issues of corporate social responsibility occurred
in 1997 when a roundtable of corporate, NGO and academic representatives created an
International Code of Ethics for Canadian Business. This followed a public outcry over
Canadian corporate activity in the Nigerian petroleum industry under the Abacha
dictatorship. The Code is a collection of beliefs, values and principles guided by an
overall vision of Canadian business abroad as both profitable and socially responsible.
The Code was adopted by 13 companies at the time of its creation. The most recent
information available indicates that only two Canadian companies, including Talisman,
have signed on since. The Code is voluntary and non-binding and in this sense does not
add much to the instruments already reviewed, but because Talisman’s efforts in
corporate responsibility are measured according it, the Code should be examined.
The Code reflects five generations of corporate conduct, with the first (conflict of
interest) bearing primarily on corporate interest while the remaining four (commercial
conduct, employee and other third party concerns, community and environmental
concerns, and accountability and social justice) refer to external interests and values. The
Code expresses the belief that “businesses should take a leadership role through
establishment of ethical business principles”, and that while “confrontation should be
tempered by diplomacy” and “national governments have the prerogative to conduct their
own government and legal affairs in accordance with their sovereign rights”, “all
governments should comply with international treaties and other agreements that they
have committed to”. The Code also enshrines principles that companies will “support and
promote the protection of international human rights within our sphere of influence” and
“not be complicit in human rights abuses”. Similarly they will “comply with all
36
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applicable laws” and will “strive for social justice and promote freedom of expression in
the workplace.”
The Code is to be implemented in individual firms through the development of
operational codes and practices. There is no guide as to how this translation is to be
effected, except that the result must be “consistent” with the Code’s provisions.
Verification is to be effected by outside parties hired by signatories to the Code for that
purpose.
V. Talisman Energy’s Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000
Talisman’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Report 2000 was released in
April 2001 in an effort to comply with the Code. The 42-page Report was verified by
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), a worldwide consulting firm, and provides a snapshot of
Talisman and its operations in Sudan. Unlike audited accounting reports, the Report is
self-admittedly not “a broad overall assessment of our presence in Sudan. Rather, it
describes how we have interpreted the Code through the Principles which we have
adopted.”37 Talisman notes that there are no generally accepted standards against which
its activities can be measured. Consequently, it plans to spend the period 2001-2003
developing performance indicators. With these, presumably, Talisman will be in a better
position to be assessed. The CSR Report observes “we intend to expand the reporting
process in future years.”38
The prototypical nature of the CSR Report is underlined in PwC’s Verification
Statement, which observes that “There are currently no statutory requirements or
generally accepted international standards for the preparation, public reporting and
attestation or corporate social responsibility reports.” For this reason PwC’s verification
approach “reflects emerging best practice and is in accordance with the International
Standard on Assurance Engagements.”39 The Verification Statement also notes
significant limitations on PwC’s work. Certain visits had to be cleared with GNPOC or
national security, who have a record of antipathy towards southerners and who might
make access to southern representatives difficult. Likewise the Statement indicates that
PwC auditors “did not visit any sites in the south of Sudan outside the concession area
but we did speak to Southern Sudanese in Khartoum and to international nongovernmental organisations in Nairobi.”40 Thus it is not entirely clear how or where
inside Sudan PwC consulted with independent southern sources.
The CSR Report goes on to define corporate social responsibility as “conducting
activities in an economically, socially and environmentally responsible manner.”41
37
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Responsibility is, in turn, conceived of according to the International Code of Ethics for
Canadian Business, a translation of the Code for GNPOC purposes (the Sudan Operating
Principles), and key stakeholder concerns. From these are derived concrete aims in the
form of Talisman objectives (“those which are under our direct control and
responsibility”), GNPOC objectives (“those objectives whose achievement depends on
the agreement or support of our GNPOC business partners”) and advocacy objectives
(“those over which we have minimal control but for which we believe we have a
responsibility to advocate within governments or international organizations”).
The CSR Report is divided into several sections. Objectives are considered in
chapters on human rights, community participation, employee rights, ethical business
conduct, health safety and the environment, and stakeholder engagement. Thus, for
instance, the International Code’s principle of support for human rights is translated into
a commitment to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under the Sudan
Operating Principles, followed by an accounting for key stakeholder concerns, and
several specific objectives. An overview of this translation is provided in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2
Talisman’s Formulation of Corporate Responsibility Objectives in the Field of Human Rights
The International
Code of Ethics for
Canadian Business

Sudan Operating
Principles

Support and promote the
protection of international
human rights within sphere
of influence.

Commitment to upholding
the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.

Not to be complicit in
human rights abuses.

Commitment to addressing
human rights concerns
arising from our own and
GNPOC operations.

Key Stakeholder
Concerns

Talisman
Objectives

Security forces activities.

GNPOC
Objectives

General Advocacy
Objectives

Promote to GNPOC
partners the formalization
of the provision of security
that complies with the
pertinent UN Codes of
Conduct.

Promote to the
Government of Sudan the
formalization of the
provision of security that
complies with the pertinent
UN Codes of Conduct.

Use corporate influence to
ensure that the GNPOC
infrastructure is not used
for offensive military
purposes.
Work with GNPOC
partners to provide training
to GNPOC security
personnel on human rights
and international standards
for use of security and
forces.
Use of oilfield
infrastructure

Human Rights

Develop a human rights
training and awareness
program for all managers
and employees working in
Sudan.
Develop and implement a
program to monitor and
investigate human rights
concerns arising from our
own and GNPOC
operations
Develop a framework for a
program of independent
monitoring of human rights
concerns arising from
Talisman and GNPOC
operations.

Promote to GNPOC
partners the development
of guidelines on the
acceptable uses of oilfield
infrastructure and promote
the implementation of this
program to our GNPOC
partners.

Promote to the
Government of Sudan the
development of guidelines
on the acceptable uses of
oilfield infrastructure.

Encourage GNPOC
partners to adopt a code of
ethics that addresses the
protection of human rights.

Meet with officials from the
Government of Sudan to
advocate support for the
Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.

Promote the principle that
people adversely impacted
by GNPOC operations
receive fair and just
compensation.
Promote a program of
independent monitoring of
humanrights to GNPOC
partners.

Promote a program of
independent monitoring of
human rights to the
Government of Sudan

The translation of principles and concerns into objectives is generally worthwhile.
Where problems arise, they are often with the appropriateness of objectives in context.
For instance, Talisman has translated the Code principle that it will “support and promote
the protection of international human rights within our sphere of influence” into “we are
committed to upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” This formulation is
questionable inasmuch as the Declaration itself is generally regarded as aspirational and
has been refined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which Sudan
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has ratified.42 These later instruments, together with such documents as the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination43, the ILO
Convention on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)44, the 1994 Declaration of
Principles and the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement – which have been approved by the
Sudanese government - would constitute a more specific and effective basis for
Talisman’s advocacy. Talisman counters that it can only be expected to advocate within
its “sphere of influence”, but this sphere should be broadly conceived by the company
given its major role in the Sudanese economy and its record of influence with the
Khartoum government. There is, moreover, no requirement that Talisman limit itself to
lobbying on the basis of documents that apply to it. In this connection the company
should recall the Code principle that “all governments should comply with international
treaties and other agreements that they have committed to”.
A second concern with objectives as detailed in the CSR Report is the failure of
Talisman to account for, and seek the return of, civilians forcibly displaced from their
homes in the concession area and along the pipeline route. The relevant international
standard in this respect, the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, mandates
that “[d]isplacement shall last no longer than required by the circumstances”. 45 The CSR
Report takes a more restricted view of the appropriate GNPOC objective: it is to
“promote the principle that people adversely impacted by GNPOC operations receive fair
and just compensation”. The Report details that during the planning and construction of
the pipeline the government formed a Pipeline Compensation Committee and “through
this process thousands of compensation cases have been paid”. However, Talisman
admits that “the process of identifying people affected by such activity and the provision
of fair compensation has not been well documented.”46 It would seem that what is
necessary is for Talisman to press GNPOC to conduct some accounting of the massive
human displacement related to oil exploration, as detailed in the Harker Report and
elsewhere, and to seek the return of people so displaced. Instead, the CSR Report speaks
merely in terms of compensation, and in that respect, in sums that could not possibly
reasonably compensate for the dislocation and hardship that have taken place.
The dissonance between Talisman and independent sources is repeated elsewhere.
The CSR Report notes, for instance, that Talisman has developed “a detailed human
rights monitoring and investigation program manual to address concerns arising from
GNPOC operations” but the small number of complaints through it does not match thirdparty reports of atrocities or abuse, suggesting some other explanation for the company’s
results. Talisman notes, for instance:
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Contained as an annex to the Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr.
Francis M. Deng, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 1998). See Principle 6(3).
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CSR Report, p. 17.
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Our records show that a further 10 cases were opened in November 2000 to keep
files of initial interviews with people who have been displaced. These cases
include six individuals who have come to Paryang during 2000 from surrounding
villages to escape from famine, disease or conflict; and two people who left
Paryang, seven and 20 years ago respectively, and have now returned.47

Contrast this with the testimony of a refugee – far from unique - about conditions in
Paryang given to the Harker mission the year before and included in its Report:
About 200 people came to Biem from Paryang. I came from Paryang in May. My
family was repatriated to Paryang from Khartoum by the Government of Sudan
and the Government would not let us leave Paryang town. The Government of
Sudan forces mistreated us. We were not given any services, we had to find our
own food and make our own living. When the women would go to gather wood
and cut grass to build shelters, the Arab militia followed is to take what we had
and rape us. I tried to escape with three others from the town. The Government of
Sudan [forces] shot at us. The others were killed. I was hit in the leg but managed
to escape.48

A similar discrepancy exists in Talisman’s version of military use of the Talisman-built
Heglig airstrip, which the company describes in terms of there having been “at least four
instances of non-defensive usage of the Heglig airstrip in 2000.” The Harker Report, on
the other hand, noted:
We also learned, and have reported, that flights clearly linked to the oil war have
been a regular feature of life at the Heglig airstrip, which is adjacent to the oil
workers’ compound. It is operated by the consortium, and Canadian chartered
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft which use the strip have shared the facilities
with helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers of the Government of Sudan.
These have armed and re-fuelled at Heglig and from there attacked civilians.49

Given details in the Harker Report and incidents raised by the U.N. Rapporteur and
NGOs, one could have reasonably expected Talisman’s auditors would make some effort
to deal with them, yet there is nothing of the sort. For example, the murder of eight Nuer
tribesmen who had gone seeking jobs with GNPOC in August 1999 and were put to death
for it, according to the Harker Report, is nowhere addressed.50 In general there is an
empty, dream-like quality to the CSR Report’s descriptions and numbers which vary so
considerably from reliable outside reports that they must be taken to greatly understate
the magnitude of the situation. Simply put, the effort made by Talisman does not square
47
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On this particular incident John Harker went so far as to express his hope in the Report that the
Government of Canada “will call for an investigation of [this] serious allegation” and added that
“[w]e hope Talisman will join us in calling for, and facilitating, the investigation we seek.” Ibid.,
p. 14.
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with its obligation under the Code and in an emerging field of international law to “take a
leadership role” in investigating and correcting human rights abuses caused by its
activities.
Perhaps the most profound weakness of the CSR Report is its failure to address
explicitly the question of the company’s continuing presence in Sudan. This is an issue
that looms large over Talisman’s operation and before any reader of the Report.
However, it receives almost no attention. Instead, the company sidesteps the question,
adopting a sort of earnest “gee shucks - we’re learning” tone and justifying its operation
in the narrowest and most formal of terms, as the following passage demonstrates:
There is a legitimate debate regarding the role of development in areas of civil
unrest. We believe that our involvement in Sudan is a positive one and that our
actions are in compliance with the International Code of Ethics for Canadian
Business. We also believe that we can help the people of Sudan by providing
employment and skills training, enhancing local infrastructure, supporting further
economic development, and by doing what we can to support peace and stability
in the region. We recognize that others have differing opinions.51

Talisman’s implicit position appears to be that “it’s better for us to be doing this than
someone else who might not be as committed to human rights as we are.” The point is,
however, that misery remains, and pumping oil by anyone exacerbates it. One might, of
course, ask the question posed by a Sudanese academic and headlined in the Report: “If
Talisman were to leave, would the oil stop flowing?”, but this undermines the principle of
the universality of human rights and has to be dismissed. Human rights are rights as well
as obligations and are Talisman’s to uphold regardless of what others do in its place. At
the very least the company could have expressed a more considered rationale for its
presence in Sudan. Without one, Talisman’s commitment to corporate social
responsibility in this context appears questionable.
There are some positive developments outlined in the CSR Report. Talisman
indicates that it will use its influence to ensure GNPOC job candidates are treated equally
and not discriminated against, a problem identified in the Harker Report.52 More
generally the company is trying to instill a community of respect for human rights among
its employees by sending Talisman employees to courses at the Pearson Peacekeeping
Centre in Clementsport, Nova Scotia. Assistance of a material nature is also being
provided through Talisman philanthropy. The CSR Report refers to Talisman-supplied
medical services, waterworks, education and emergency relief worth $1 million given in
2000. More money will be given in future. The CSR Report includes a profile of
51
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“Certainly, there seem to be few, if any, Nuer or Dinka at work at Heglig, which seems to fit a
widely held view in Western Upper Nile that the [Government of Sudan], thus GNPOC, views all
non-Arabs as potential threats to security. … If Talisman was serious about being a good
corporate citizen, it would win the support of its GNPOC partners to have an audit of hiring and
employment practices carried out by the International Labour Organization.” Harker Report, p.
14 (emphasis in original).
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GNPOC’s national employee complex in Khartoum, although systemic bias in GNPOC
hiring means few southerners are likely to benefit from it. It also highlights Talisman’s
assistance to a vocational school, again in Khartoum, which provides trades training to
1,000 boys. The CSR Report does not say, however, what Talisman is doing to improve
vocational prospects for Sudanese women.
Talisman’s efforts are noteworthy. At the same time, however, they must be
understood in the context of what GNPOC is doing. Oil development is the indirect cause
of serious human rights abuses in Sudan. Talisman and its partners appear to be trying to
do something about them, but they have completely neglected the group rights that are at
the root of these acts and an honest examination of their own contribution to the conflict.
Many critical questions have been raised by others and could have been addressed here.
In most respects they were not. Consequently, the CSR Report comes across as
superficial and falls well short of evoking the robust spirit in which the Code was
conceived.
VI. Conclusion
Talisman Energy’s CSR Report in southern Sudan presents a mixed, but
ultimately disappointing, picture. On the one hand the company has committed itself to a
leadership role in corporate social responsibility and has done some things to alleviate
some individual human rights abuses. On the other hand, the company’s actions to date
appear insufficient. It has failed to adequately examine the most profound question,
which is whether it should pull-out. There can be nothing but a sense of dissatisfaction at
Talisman’s failure to assess its Sudan operation critically.
What can be done? The situation here is complicated by the form in which
Talisman operates in Sudan. GNPOC is Mauritius-registered and Khartoum-based. It has
a part owner which is Canadian. Could Canada be held responsible for Talisman/GNPOC
acts? International law does not provide a general rule on the attribution of responsibility
for corporate activity. Some reference to broad principle is necessary.
The general rule of international law is to authorize the national state of a
company to exercise a right of diplomatic protection on its behalf. At the same time
several regimes and authorities of international law require a genuine link or connection
between a company and a protecting state based on the nature and quality of the contacts
in question.53 If a right of diplomatic protection is enjoyed, there is presumptively no
reason why a duty of diplomatic responsibility should not arise. It makes sense that this
duty should be proportional to the foreseeability and degree of corporate involvement, to
the capacity to act, and to the nature and gravity of the wrong.
In this instance it is clear that Mauritius has no real connection with the situation
C.F. Amerasinghe, “Jurisdiction Ratione Personae under the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States” (1974-75) 47 Br. Y.B. Int’l L.
227 at 267.
53
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and that the national governments of Talisman’s major co-partners, China and Malaysia,
will not pursue the matter. Canada is left to deal with the abuses, which are serious and
not entirely unforeseen.54 The government has asked Talisman to adhere to the Code and
has undertaken a process of dialogue with the Sudanese government. In light of the
Code’s modest impact on Talisman’s corporate conduct, however, what else can be done?
The Harker Report referred to several options, including putting certain Sudanese goods
on the Import Control List, putting Sudan itself on the Area Control List, or, in the case
of multilateral sanctions against Sudan, invoking the Special Economic Measures Act.
The difficulty with all of these options is that Canada-Sudan trade is negligible and that
there is no enthusiasm for multilateral sanctions against Sudan.55 This leaves the
government’s current strategy of constructive engagement as the only practical prospect.
Another consideration is the United States. Sudan may be distant, but it has not
gone unnoticed in Washington. The fact that Canadian and other foreign oil companies
are profiting from their Sudanese ventures has increased American oil companies’
interest in joining them. At present they are forbidden by U.S. sanctions from
participating in operations in Sudan, but recent American diplomacy has indicated a
desire to find a solution to the conflict.56 There are signs that Sudanese political figures
have been receptive to this pressure.57
Could Canadian corporate behaviour be a catalyst for change abroad? That is
clearly Talisman and the government’s hope. Those who observe events in Sudan with
history in mind will recall the “intermediate” period of Canadian corporate participation
in South Africa in the 1970s after the Canadian government’s prohibition on new
investment but before the push for divestment. At that time like arguments were made
about continuing the corporate presence of enlightened foreign employers under
“Canada has in the past expressed grave reservations concerning private sector involvement
that may heighten tensions or otherwise fuel ongoing conflicts. Canada has consistently
discouraged companies from doing business in Sudan and in 1992 suspended all support,
including export finance and trade development programs. It has also issued warnings regarding
therisks of working in the Sudanese oilfields due to security concerns and the potential danger to
employees.” Harker Report, p. 25.
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implementing a decision, resolution or recommendation of an international organization of states
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international crisis.” The phrase “grave breach of international peace and security” is generally
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apartheid.
It is hard, however, to make any such analogy here. The prevailing political
constellation, the specificity of the actors involved, the rights at issue and the magnitude
of abuse all call for a serious re-evaluation of Canadian corporate activity in Sudan. In
this respect it should also be recalled that the intermediate period in apartheid-era South
Africa was followed by widespread divestment.

